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INTRODUCTION

Jerusalem is the capital city no one recognizes.' Deeply tied to each
of the world's major monotheistic religions, access to its major spiritual
sites has been protected by regimes as diverse in time and circumstance
as the Ottoman Empire, the Western European powers occupying it
either as colonizers or stewards, and the modern States of Israel and
Jordan. 2 The critical role it plays for the world's religious adherents
(together, Christians and Muslims account for roughly half the global
population) explains its status under international law and the
challenges modem governments face in reconciling effective Israeli
control of the city with its regional and global significance. U.N.
General Assembly Resolution 181 provided for the separation of the
British Mandate of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states and carved out3
Jerusalem as a corpus separatum under the sovereignty of no state.
That policy effectively captures the foreign policies of most states
today, which not only refuse to acknowledge Israeli sovereignty over
East Jerusalem, which it occupied, annexed and expanded in 1967, but
also West Jerusalem, which it has held since shortly after its founding in
1948. 4
Since Israel's establishment, the United States has acted consistently
with Resolution 181 and its general vision for peacefully coexisting
Arab and Jewish states in the land between the Mediterranean and the
Jordan River, although the borders and character of those states have
evolved over time.5 The United States has similarly refused to prejudice
Jerusalem. It recognizes no state's sovereignty over either West or East
Jerusalem and maintains a consular presence there separate from the
activities of the Ambassador to Israel located in Tel Aviv. 6 This Article
i. Chad Emmett, The Capital Cities of Jerusalem, 86 GEOGRAPHIC REv. 233, 239
(1996) ("Because Israel refused to recognize the U.N. plan for an internationalized Jerusalem
and because of its annexation of occupied East Jerusalem in 1967, no country in the world has
offered legal and diplomatic recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.").
2. Id.at236-38.
3. G.A. Res. 181 (II), U.N. Doc. A/516 (Nov. 29, 1947); Leon Sheleff, Jerusalem Figmentof the Imagination,53 GEOJOURNAL 297, 306 (2001).
4. Sheleff, supra note 3, at 298.
5. The United States has considered, at one time or another, a separate Palestinian state,
return of the occupied territory to Jordan, or joint Jordanian-Palestinian condominium over the
West Bank. See generally U.S. POLICY ON PALESTINE FROM WILSON TO CLINTON (Michael W.
Suleiman ed., 1994).
6. Consulate General of the United States: Jerusalem, http://jerusalem.usconsulate.gov/
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argues that U.S. policy toward Israel/Palestine in general and Jerusalem
in particular is changing to allow greater flexibility toward the political
realities that may confront both the city and the countries that surround
it. Analyzing presidential speeches on Jerusalem from Clinton to
Obama as well as litigation embodying congressional-presidential
disagreement over the city, this Article concludes that U.S. policy,
while still technically adhering to the two-state solution, has openly if
quietly acknowledged that the window for two states is closing if it has
not closed already. If the Palestinian movement for self-determination
changes from one sounding in international law and the language
of sovereignty to one situated within the context of civil rights and
equal treatment with Israelis, the United States may face, and is
preparing to face, a single political entity with significant Arab and
Jewish populations. Jerusalem is already a microcosm of this reality,
with its Arab residents increasingly electing Israeli citizenship, voting in
municipal elections, and integrating into Israeli institutions of higher
education.
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Jerusalem, far more than conventional wisdom suggests, is
fundamentally and essentially tied to the viability of the two-state
solution. The city lies on the periphery of Israel proper and deep into
territory surrounded by the borders of the West Bank.7 One of Israel's
about the embassy.html (last visited June 11, 2014).
7. Saul Cohen, Jerusalem's Unity and West Bank Autonomy - PairedPrinciples, 13
MIDDLE E. REv. 27-34 (1981).
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most important West Bank settlements, Ma'ale Adumim, lies to the east
of Jerusalem and Israel maintains concrete plans to link the two,
effectively dissecting the West Bank. As a result, the question of
Jerusalem really is the question of two states or one.
This Article analyzes presidential speeches and the pleadings of the
U.S. Government in response to a lawsuit by Jerusalem-born U.S.
citizen Menachem Zivotofsky seeking to have "Israel" listed in his U.S.
passport rather than "Jerusalem" as U.S. law now requires. The picture
that emerges is one of a growing flexibility in U.S. policy toward
Israel/Palestine in general and Jerusalem in particular. That flexibility
moves away from adherence to two states (and impliedly two capitals in
Jerusalem) to one emphasizing various "kinds" of democracy that may
characterize a future Israeli state.
Part I of this Article provides a brief summary of Jerusalem in the
history of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict as well as U.S. law and policy
toward Jerusalem. Part II provides a brief overview of the scholarly
disagreement over how and under what circumstances the United States
develops its foreign policy preferences focusing on interpretations of
international law. Contesting the widespread view that foreign policy
positions and interpretations of international law are traceable to
responsible bureaucracies who act with a clear path to their desired
outcome, Part II argues that U.S. foreign policy and legal positions are
subject to intermittent but nevertheless influential legal pressures-what
Rebecca Ingber describes as "interpretation catalysts"-that regularly
force the United States to frame or re-frame foreign policy preferences.
These catalysts include both presidential speeches and litigation over
foreign policy positions. Part II analyzes two of these framing events:
Presidential speeches from Clinton to Obama and pleadings filed in the
long-running dispute between Menachem Zivotofsky and the U.S.
Government over the designation in his passport. That litigation is, in
effect, the latest round in the dispute between Congress and the
President over Jerusalem's status under U.S. law. Part III applies
insights from the analysis in Part II to current trends in the movement
for Palestinian self-determination. Those trends demonstrate a shift in
ideology from self-determination as a form of sovereignty under
international law to self-determination as civil rights and equality with
Israeli citizens. As a result of these movements, I ultimately argue that
for the window to two-states
U.S. policy is shifting in preparation
8
already.
closed
not
has
it
if
closing,
8.
So far, the number of settlers living in communities that would need to be
evacuated has not passed the point of irreversibility. Jerusalem is still
dividable. Hamas is confined to its Gaza fortress. And Abbas, a Palestinian
leader like no other before and perhaps no other to come, remains in office.
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I. U.S.

POLICY TOWARD JERUSALEM: AN OVERVIEW

Scholarly histories of the colonial, political, social, and geostrategic
changes leading to the formation of a Zionist movement in Europe and
its focus on Palestine as the site for the establishment of a Jewish state
are arguably as conflicting and angry as the wars that ensued. 9 What
may be safely stated is that Jerusalem's historical and religious
importance made it an early and frequent flashpoint as European Jewish
immigrants and the indigenous Arab population built mutual mistrust
from the late nineteenth century and into the early twentieth. After the
British government pledged its support for the establishment of a Jewish
National Home in Palestine in 1917, both urban and rural Arab
populations organized protests against the so-called "Balfour
Declaration."' 0 In 1920, riots broke out in Jerusalem's Old City which
killed nine people and left hundreds injured." Between 1921 and 1929,
Jerusalem became the focal point of prominent Palestinians' efforts to
lobby the British government to end liberal Jewish immigration policies
as well as to articulate a Palestinian self-determination movement that
differed from the larger zan-Arab movement prompted by the collapse
of the Ottoman Empire.
By the end of Barack Obama's presidency, however, every one of these
circumstances could vanish-and if that happens, the two-state solution will
vanish along with them.
Ben Bimbaum, The Last Chance, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 2013, at 16.
9. In relatively modem times, "Zionism" has taken on a somewhat pejorative
connotation in political discourse. By "Zionism" I mean only the movement originating in
Europe in the late nineteenth century which aimed to create-somewhere in the world-a
Jewish majority state since Zionism's founders attributed the historical persecution of Jews in
Europe to their minority status in every state. Because the modem State of Israel did not exist
before 1948, it is necessary to refer either to specific Jewish institutions in the British Mandate
of Palestine like the Jewish Agency (the organization overseeing Jewish immigration), Haganah
(the precursor to the IDF), the Jewish National Fund (the quasi-governmental land-holding
institution), or others. For the sake of simplicity I broadly include these institutions as "Zionists"
or "Zionist organizations." See generally WALTER LAQUEUR, A HISTORY OF ZIONISM (2003).
10. DAVID FROMKIN, A PEACE TO END ALL PEACE 297 (1989); Tom Segev, When
Zionism was an Arab Cause, Haaretz, June 12, 2014, http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/themakings-of-history/when-zionism-was-an-arab-cause-1.422991.
11.

SHAW COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE PALESTINE DISTURBANCES OF

AUGUST 12, 1929 (1930).
12.

BEVERLY MILTON-EDWARDS, ISLAMIC POLITICS IN PALESTINE 25 (1999); THE FUTURE

OF JERUSALEM: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN INTERNATIONAL ACADEMIC

SEMINAR ON THE FUTURE OF JERUSALEM 33 (Gershon Baskin & R. Twite eds., 1993);
Without East Jerusalem there would be no West Bank. It is the navel, the
pivotal link between Nablus to the north and Hebron to the south. Together
with its Arab suburbs, it is the largest Arab concentration on the West Bank. It
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The political spilled over to the religious. In the Old City of
Jerusalem, the Western or Wailing Wall runs along the western edge of
the Haram al-Sharif, or Temple Mount, an area believed in Islamic
tradition to be the place where Muhammad ascended to heaven and in
Judaism as the general location of the most important inner sanctuary of
the First and Second Temples (in English generally rendered as "holy of
holies" or "most holy place"). 3 In Christian and Jewish traditions, the
site is tied to Abraham's willingness, at God's request, to sacrifice his
son Isaac (in Islamic tradition, Abraham and his son-whether it is
Ismail or Isaac is not clear-share the decision to sacrifice and the
location is thought to be closer to Mecca).14
Since 1187, the Temple Mount area has been administered by an
Islamic trust (waql). 15 Throughout the centuries, access to the Western
Wall and the Temple Mount has been largely available to religious
adherents who have been for the most part mutually tolerant with
respect to worship practices. Beginning as early as 1925, Arab residents
and worshippers started to perceive what would have historically been
relatively minor actions like placing chairs or screens at the Western
Wall as efforts to assert Jewish sovereignty over the site.1 6 Between
August 15, 1929 and August 19, 1929, Jews and Arabs undertook
separate, politically charged marches on the Western Wall, asserting
their sovereignty over it. Both Arabic and Hebrew language press
17
published inflammatory flyers and leaflets accompanying the marches.
In the riots that ensued, 133 Jews and 116 Arabs were killed and 339
is the former capital of the sanjak (district) of Jerusalem under the Ottomans, as
well as of mandatory Palestine. The highest proportion of the Palestinian
professional elite under occupation resides in it. It is the holiest of the Muslim
shrines on Palestinian soil. Muslims first turned to it in prayer before they
turned to Mecca ...It evokes the proudest Palestinian and Arab historical
memories. It contains the oldest religious endowments of Palestinians, their
most prestigious secular institutions-the cumulative and priceless patrimony
of a millennium and a quarter of residence. Architecturally it is distinctively
Arab. In ownership and property, it is overwhelmingly so. It is the natural
capital of Arab Palestine.
Walid Khalidi, Thinking the Unthinkable: A Sovereign Palestinian State, 56 FOREIGN AFF. 695,

705 (1978).
13.

TEDDY KOLLEK & MOSHE PEARLMAN, JERUSALEM: A HISTORY OF FORTY CENTURIES

155-61 (1968). Originally, David chose Jerusalem for purely pragmatic reasons. See Emmett,
supra note 1, at 234.
14. Sheleff, supra note 3, at 297.
15. See generally Yehoshua Frenkel, Politicaland Social Aspects of Islamic Religious
Endowments ("awqdf'): Saladin in Cairo (1169-73) and Jerusalem (1187-93), 62 BULL. SCH.
ORIENTAL & AFR. STUDS. 1 (1991).
16.

(1937).
17.

SHAW COMMISSION, supra note 11, at 28; RONALD STORRS, ORIENTATIONS 420

SHAW COMMISSION, supranote 11, at 55-56.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol26/iss2/1

6

Halabi: Jerusalem in the Courts and on the Ground

JERUSALEMIN THE COURTS AND ON THE GROUND

229

Jews and 232 Arabs were injured. 18 While many tales emerged that
reflected intercommunal sympathies (Jewish hospitals treated Arab
victims while Arab neighbors hid and gave refuge to Jews), the riots
opened an intractable fissure between Arab and Jewish communities
that was to eventually manifest in open war. 19 After a far more
widespread revolt by Palestinian Arabs in 1936, the British
government introduced
the first of many future proposals that aimed to divide mandatory
Palestine into Arab and Jewish states (see map to left),2 ° swap territory
to
accommodate
demographic
realities, and ensure that Jerusalem
remained open and available to the
millions21 of pilgrims who wished to
visit it.

The Peel Commission Report was
issued in 1937 and was deemed
unworkable a year later by a separate
......
commission because both Arabs and
Jews rejected it.22 In 1939, the British
government reversed course and
proposed a single state of Palestine
with Arabs and Jews ruling in
Sproportion
to their populations as well
as promising limitations on Jewish
immigration. While the document was
N gsilent
as to Jerusalem's status, it
S
exhorted Arabs and Jews to cooperate
S
"together to ensure peace.., because
EGYPT
their country is revered by many
I \millions
of Moslems, Jews and
Proposed Jewish state
Christians throughout the world who
Proposed Arabs State
pray for peace in Palestine and for the
Ama to remain under
L
BW'sh#anat e
happiness of her people." 23 Zionist
Icommunities and increasingly well18. Id. at 65; KAREN ARMSTRONG, JERUSALEM: ONE CITY, THREE FAITHS 380-83 (1996).
19. See generally Neil A. Silberman, Visions of the Future: Albright in Jerusalem,19191929, 56 BIBLICAL ARCHAEOLOGIST 8 (1993).
20.

PALESTINIAN ACADEMIC SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, The

Peel
Commission
Partition
Proposal,
1937
http://www.passia.org/publications/ bookmaps/pagel.htm.

[Map

7],

available

at

21. See generally British Policy in Palestine, 1937-38: From the Peel to the Woodhead
Report, BULL. INT'L NEWS 3 (1938).
22. Id.
23. AVALON
PROJECT,
British
W hite
Paper
of
1939, available at

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/ 20thcentury/brwhl939.asp.
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24

armed militia groups forcefully opposed the proposal. Between 1939
and 1946, World War II thinned an already inadequate British security
presence, Jewish institutions (including the nascent Israeli military)
became more developed, and the United Nations replaced the League of
Nations as the forum in which the question of Palestine would be
resolved.
In 1947, the British government announced its intention to terminate
its mandate over Palestine and invited recommendations from the newly
established United Nations. In response, the United Nations appointed a
Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) which presented a number
of recommendations including partition, economic union, and a single
federal state. 25 The final resolution, U.N. General Assembly Resolution
181, favored partition between Arab and Jewish states with Jerusalem
designated as a corpus separatum under U.N. authority.

Resolution 181 was adopted on November 29, 1947 and the British
withdrew from Palestine on May 14, 1948.26 Between these two dates
Arab and Jewish sides fought an internal civil war in the mandate
territory and afterwards, Arab forces from surrounding states invaded in
24. Manuel Hassassian, The Palestinian National Movement 1919-1939, in SHARED
HISTORIES: A PALESTINIAN ISRAELI DIALOGUE 100 (Paul Scham, et al. eds., 2005).
25. FRED JOHN KHOURi, THE ARAB-ISRAELI DILEMMA, 43-48 (1985); Thomas Lippman,
The View from 1947: The CIA and the PartitionofPalestine,61 MIDDLE E. J., 17, 21 (2007).
26. BBC NEWS, Key Maps-UN Partition Plan for Palestine, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/
english/static/in depth/world/2001/israel and_palestinians/keymaps/6.stm (last visited June
18, 2014).
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an effort to prevent partition.27 Although the new Israeli leadership
technically accepted Resolution 181,28 including Jerusalem's status, it
undertook an organized campaign to empty West Jerusalem of its Arab
inhabitants to (1) establish the capital of the new state there and (2)
secure the route between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, then and now Israel's
most populous city. 29 While Jordan did not accept Resolution 181 (and
therefore Jerusalem's international status), it colluded with the Israeli
leadership to expropriate the bulk of the territories Resolution 181
designated for Palestinian Arabs. 30 The war left Jerusalem divided
between Israel and Jordan, with the Old City and its major religious
sites under Jordanian control.31

32

27.

Rashid Khalidi, The Palestinians and the Failure of 1948, in THE WAR FOR

PALESTINE 12-15 (Eugene Rogan & Avi Shlaim eds., 2007); DAVID BEN-GURION, ISRAEL:
YEARS OF CHALLENGE 39-40 (1963).
28. See, e.g., ABBA EBAN, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 140-42 (1977); MARTIN GILBERT, THE
ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: ITS HISTORY INMAPS 37 (1981).
29. See generally THE JERUSALEM QUESTION AND ITS RESOLUTION: SELECTED
DOCUMENTS 83 (R. Lapidoth & M. Hirsch eds., 1994); see also BENNY MORRIS, THE BIRTH OF
THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM, 1947-1949, at 112 (1987); DAN KURZMAN, GENESIS 1948:
THE FIRST ARAB-ISRAELI WAR 141-46 (1970); LARRY COLLINS & DOMINIQUE LAPIERRE, 0
JERUSALEM 112 (1972); HENRY CATTAN, JERUSALEM 36 (1981); WALID KHALIDI, ALL THAT

1948, at 30102 (1992); Teddy Kollek, Again, the Right US. Stance on Jerusalem, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15,
1990, at 413, available at 1990 WLNR 2973376; Nathan Krystall, The De-Arabization of West
Jerusalem 1947-50, 28 J. PALESTINE STUDS. 5, 6-7 (1998).
REMAINS: THE PALESTINIAN VILLAGES OCCUPIED AND DEPOPULATED BY ISRAEL IN

30.

See generally AvI SHLAIM, COLLUSION ACROSS THE JORDAN: KING ABDULLAH, THE

ZIONIST MOVEMENT AND THE PARTITION OF PALESTINE (1998).

31.

Alan Baker, Is JerusalemReally Negotiable? An Analysis ofJerusalem'sPlace in the

Peace Process, 24 JEWISH POL. STUDS. REV. 78 (2013).

32.

BBC News, Key Maps-Jerusalem, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/indepth/
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In 1967, Israel conquered all of Jerusalem and the West Bank,
politically reunifying the city and obtaining control over the Temple
Mount which it left under the stewardship of the Islamic waqf.3 It
offered Israeli citizenship to Arabs living in Jerusalem in 1967, most of
whom rejected the offer. 34 They became so-called Jerusalem residents,
neither citizens of Israel nor civilians subject to the same rules of
occupation which applied to other Palestinian residents living in the
West Bank.

~35

In 1980, Israel officially annexed East Jerusalem and the areas
within the redrawn municipal boundary which included settlements
built over the 1967 "Green Line." 36 The U.N. Security Council declared
world/2001/israel andjalestinians/key maps/3.stm (last visited June 18, 2014).
33. JAN DE JONG, GREATER JERUSALEM: A SPECIAL REPORT 1SR (1997); Sheleff, supra
note 3, at 297.
34. Sheleff, supra note 3, at 298; see generally, Helga Tawil-Souri, Uneven Borders,
Coloured (Im) mobilities: ID Cards in Palestine/Israel,17 GEOPOLITICS 153 (2012).
35. BBC NEWS, supranote 32.
36. See generally Ian Lustick, Has IsraelAnnexed East Jerusalem?, 5 MIDDLE E. POL'Y
COUNCIL J. 34 (1997). In many academic and media publications, Israel's "annexation" of East
Jerusalem occurred in both 1967 and in 1980. Ziv Bohrer explains Israeli actions in this way:
In 1967, immediately after the war, the Israeli Parliament amended an act
passed in 1948 called (Bohrer's translation): "The Regulation of Government
and Law Ordinance of 1948." The 1967 amendment (which added article 1 lb
to the law) authorized the Israeli executive to expand (by way of publishing
executive decrees) the jurisdiction of Israeli law to any territory that was part of
mandatory Palestine but did not become part of the State of Israel after the war
of 1948. Based on this new legal authority, the Israeli executive published the
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the "Jerusalem Law" null and void and a violation of international
law. 37 In 1993, Israel and the Palestinians agreed
38 to settle the final status
negotiation.
by
matters
other
and
of Jerusalem
U.S. Executive Branch policy from 1948 forward never recognized
Israeli or Jordanian sovereignty over any part of Jerusalem. 39 In 1949,
when Israel announced its intention to convene its parliament's first
meeting in the part of Jerusalem it controlled, the United States refused
to send a representative to attend, noting that the U.S. Government
"Regulation of Government and Law Decree (No. 1) of 1967" which expanded
the jurisdiction of Israeli law, judiciary and administration to East Jerusalem. In
other words, Israel annexed East Jerusalem, using secondary legislation,
already in 1967. The legal change done in 1980 was mostly symbolic-at that
year the Israeli Parliament passed: "Basic Law: Jerusalem Capital of Israel."
The term "Basic Law" is the term used in Israeli law for constitutional
amendments. Article 1 of that Basic Law (which is the article that annoyed the
world) declared "The whole and unified Jerusalem is the capital of the State of
Israel." Though it annoyed the world, the actual implications of that article, at
that time, were minimal at best; as, on the one hand, Israel already annexed
East Jerusalem in 1967, and on the other hand, at that time (i.e. from 1980 to
2000) the basic law did not include a map of what is considered "whole and
unified Jerusalem" and further this basic law was not protected from any future
amendments (i.e. the parliament in 1980 did not limit, in any unique way, its
ability in the future to amend or cancel the basic law - and so theory that basic
law could have been changed or canceled in a session of parliament in which
only one MP is present). These two issues, however, were amended in 2000
and articles 5-7 were added to the basic law. Article 5 refers to a map that
defines the municipal jurisdiction of Jerusalem and that map includes East
Jerusalem. Article 6 prohibits the Israeli Government from transferring to any
foreign element any authorities currently found at the hands of either the Israeli
central government or the municipal government of the City of Jerusalem.
Article 7 further limits the ability to amend articles 5 and 6, by allowing to
amend these articles only by a majority of 61 or more MPs out of 120.
Email from Ziv Bohrer, Faculty of Law, Bar-Ilan University, to author (Feb. 8, 2014,
13:56 EST) (on file with author).
37. Sheleff, supra note 3, at 300.
[T]he immediate effect of the legislation aimed ostensibly at strengthening
Israel's hold on Jerusalem was actually to weaken its international standing - it
should be noted particularly that the countries that moved were all amongst
Israel's strongest allies, as they were the ones who had earlier agreed to place
their embassies there, most countries refusing to do so, because its status is in
dispute, having been originally assigned, as mentioned, as an international city.
Id.
38. CLYDE MARK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20339, JERUSALEM: THE U.S. EMBASSY &
P.L. 104-45, at 2 (1999).
39. DAVID BEN-GURION, ISRAEL: A PERSONAL HISTORY 331 (1971); SYDNEY D. BAILEY,
FOUR ARAB-ISRAELI WARS AND THE PEACE PROCESS 64-65 (1990).
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"cannot support any arrangement which would purport to authorize the
establishment of Israeli . . . sovereignty over parts of the Jerusalem
area." 40 The United States similarly opposed the Jordanian effort to
declare East Jerusalem its "second" capital (after Amman) in 1950.41
The State Department established a formal diplomatic presence in Tel
Aviv for relations with Israel and separate consular offices in
Jerusalem. 42 Arab and Jewish U.S. citizens born within Jerusalem's
1948 municipal borders are designated as having been born in
"Jerusalem" consistent with this non-recognition. Congress, however,
became more active on the issue after the 1980 Jerusalem Law, both
directly and indirectly seeking to have the city's status as Israel's capital
formalized.43 Several U.S. Presidents, including Ronald Reagan, George
H.W. Bush, and William Clinton, have stated that Jerusalem should
remain united and its final status should be determined by negotiation,
implying that Israelis and Palestinians might both establish recognized
capitals there and further implying that U.S. policy
disfavors separation
44
of the type experienced between 1948 and 1967.
II. JERUSALEM UNDER U.S. LAW
U.S foreign policy positions including interpretations of international
law are often depicted as the result of a deliberative process that
originates within a fixed set of institutions like the Department of
Defense, the Department of State, •45
the Department of the Treasury, or
other foreign policy bureaucracies. There is correspondingly little
40. Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs
(Satterthwaite) to the Secretary of State (Feb. 9, 1949), available at http://digicol1.library.wisc.
edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUSFRUS 1949v06&Isize=M&submit=Go+to+p
age&page=739.
41. RICHARD F. NYROP, JORDAN A COUNTRY STUDY 27 (1980); James Baker's Letter of
Assurance to the Palestinians (Oct. 18, 1991); SAUL B. COHEN, JERUSALEM: BRIDGING THE FOUR
WALLS 198-99 (1977).
42. Emmett, supra note 1, at 240.
43. Id.
44. Statement by the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, 4 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY CURRENT DOCUMENTS 497, 498
(1984) (statement of Lawrence Eagleburger, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs);
Stephen Zunes, Clinton's Stand on Jerusalem Reverses Longstanding U.S. Policy, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, June 6, 1995, at A7. There have been an overwhelming number of
proposals advanced as to how to meet the goal of two capitals in a single city. See generally
Emmett, supra note 1.
45. See, e.g., Stephen D. Krasner, Are BureaucraciesImportant?, 7 FOREIGN POL'Y 159,
161 (1971) ("The behavior of states is the outcome of a rational decision-making process. This
process has three steps. The options for a given situation are spelled out. The consequences of
each option are projected. A choice is made which maximizes the values held by the decision
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agreement as to which of these constituencies, or the President, prevails
when they disagree, but that disagreement focuses principally on
internal factors
within the foreign policy making and legal interpretation
46
frameworks.
The reality is more complex.47 Foreign policy outcomes and legal
interpretations are guided not only by the conscious construction of
decision-making agencies and persons as well as constitutional
constraints, but also by myriad social, psychological and structural
frames. 48 Public statements by foreign policy decision-makers, for
example, form real expectations for the speaker and those upon whom
the speaker relies (like economic and military partners). So deviations,
even minor ones, may facilitate major changes. 49 This explains in part
how Clinton's 2000 parameters for Israeli-Palestinian peace could make
explicit the U.S. objective of a state of "Palestine" without actually
uttering that word, which George W. Bush was the first U.S. President
to do.
Rebecca Ingber has elaborated upon a particular set of these frames
which she labels "interpretation catalysts.' 50 According to her analysis,
foreign policy preferences and legal interpretations are not only
inherited and shaped from one administration to the next, but also
influenced by exogenous events which require the President and
executives surrounding bureaucracies to "consider, determine, and
assert, whether publicly or not, a position on a matter of legal
interpretation." 51 These events include, inter alia, a legal position
asserted in the course of litigation, the formation of the President's
position in a speech or other announcement, or periodic reporting
requirements imposed under human rights treaties. With respect to
Jerusalem, two of these interpretation "catalysts" have prompted
makers.").
46. See

JOHN

G.

IKENBERRY, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: THEORETICAL ESSAYS

395

(2002).
47. See, e.g., Deborah Welch Larson, The Role of BeliefSystems and Schemas in Foreign
Policy Decision-Making, 15 POL. PSYCHOL. 17, 17 (1994); ALEX MINTZ & KARL DEROUEN, JR.,
UNDERSTANDING FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING 156 (2010); Michael J. Shapiro & G.
Matthew Bonham, Cognitive Process and Foreign Policy Decision-Making, 17 INT'L STUDS. Q.

147, 147 (1973).
48.

Paul A. Anderson, Justifications and Precedents as Constraints in Foreign Policy

Decision-Making,25 AM. J. POL. SCI. 738, 738-39 (1981) ("[E]ven if it were possible to define
the national interest, and if organizations could act in ways consistent with a single underlying
goal, the limited information-processing capabilities of humans would be sufficient to
undermine these approaches.").
49. Id. at 740-41.
50. See generally Rebecca Ingber, Interpretation Catalysts and Executive Branch
Decision-Making,38 YALE J. INT'L L. 359 (2013).

51.
52.

Id.at367.
Id.
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identifiable if subtle changes in U.S. policy toward Jerusalem: (1)
Litigation between the Executive and a Jerusalem-born U.S. citizen,
Menachem Zivotofsky, to have "Israel" listed as the place of birth in his
passport and (2) Presidential speeches from Clinton to Obama.
A. Congress and the Presidenton Jerusalemfrom Clinton to Obama
The Zivotofsky litigation is the most recent manifestation of a longrunning disagreement between Congress and the President over the
status of Jerusalem under both U.S. and international law. 53 Congress's
position on Jerusalem took its strongest form with the Jerusalem
Embassy Act of 1995, although there were several precursors that failed
because Congress could not agree on a statutory strategy.54 In 1983,
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan introduced legislation which would
have required the U.S. embassy in Israel to be moved from Tel Aviv to
Jerusalem. The Secretary of State, George Shultz, in a letter to the
Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, objected to this
legislation on the grounds that it interfered with the President's55

authority to recognize foreign governments at his discretion. 56
Subsequent statements by the administration affirmed this position
and criticized the bill on the grounds that it would undermine the United

States' ability to aid in the peace process, 57 and that peace could come
about only through negotiations.

In 1990, President George H.W. Bush stated publicly that the Israeli
government should establish no new settlements in East Jerusalem. 59 In

response to this statement,

Congress passed Senate Concurrent

53. See generally Zivotofsky v. Sec'y of State, 511 F. Supp. 2d 97 (D.D.C. 2007).
54. See generally Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practiceof the United States Relating
to InternationalLaw, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 179 (2003).
55. Letter from George P. Shultz, Secretary of State, to Dante B. Fascell, Chairman,
Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 13, 1984), cited in
Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, to Abner J. Mikva, Counsel
to the President (May 16, 1995), reprintedin 104 CONG. REc. S 15,469 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1995).
56. Frederick G. Dutton, 'JerusalemBill': A Loser, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1984, at A21.
57. See Lawrence Eagleburger, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, The Status
of Jerusalem is an Integral Part of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Statement Before the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee (Feb. 23, 1984), in 4

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY CURRENT

DOCUMENTS 497, 498 (1984); Richard Murphy, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs, Meeting the Challenges of the Middle East, Address Before the
Chicago Conference of the American-Arab Affairs Council (Mar. 23, 1984), in 4 AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY CURRENT DOCUMENTS 484, 487 (1984).
58. President Ronald Reagan, Remarks at the Young Leadership Conference of the
United Jewish Appeal (Mar. 13, 1984), in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES, ADMINISTRATION OF RONALD REAGAN, BOOK 1,340,344 (1984).
59. Major Garrett, Bush Firm on IsraelPolicy, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1990, at Al.
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Resolution 106.60 This resolution, which passed overwhelmingly in the
•

House of Representaties,

61

stated Congress's position that Jerusalem is

and should remain the capital of Israel.62 The President, during a
meeting with Jerusalem's mayor, indicated that the city's final status
should be determined by negotiations. 63 In 1992, Congress passed
Senate Concurrent Resolution 113. This resolution largely reiterated the
stance of Congress presented in the previous resolution. 64 Despite the
similarities, this resolution did not elicit any appreciable response from
President Bush or his administration.
The Jerusalem Embassy Act, 65 enacted in 1995, was the first
movement in Congress which garnered sufficient support to impose
statutorily binding language based on at least some constitutional
authority. 66 Not only did the Act call for recognizing Jerusalem as
Israel's capital, it also ordered that a new embassy in Jerusalem should
be established no later than May 31 of 19996 The law included a
provision authorizing the President to waive that part of the law in the
name of U.S. national interests. The waiver allows the President to
postpone moving the embassy to protect national security. 68 President
Clinton opposed the law on the basis that it prejudiced the U.S. stand on
Jerusalem and subverted his constitutional authority. 69 Despite his
public opposition to the bill, Clinton did not veto it, stating that it would
most likely be overridden by Congress. The President did make clear
70
that he would utilize the waiver to prevent relocation of the embassy.
Lawrence M. O'Rourke, Jerusalem Strains US.-Israeli Ties, ST. Louis POSTApr. 29, 1990, at lB.
61. Major Garrett, House Accepts Jerusalem as Israeli Capital, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 25,
1990, at A4.
62. 136 CONG. REc. 4,690 (1990).
63. Marlin Fitzwater, Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on the President's Meeting
with Mayor Teddy Kollek of Jerusalem (May 3, 1990), in I PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS
OF THE UNITED STATES, ADMINISTRATION OF GEORGE H.W. BUSH, BOOK I, at 621 (1990).
64. 138 CONG. REC. 10,344 (1992).
65. Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-45, 109 Stat. 398.
66. Id. § 3(a).
67. Id.
68. Id. § 7.
69. President Bill Clinton, The President's News Conference with President Hosni
Mubarak of Egypt (Mar. 10, 1997), in 1 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES, ADMINISTRATION OF BILL CLINTON, BOOK I, at 269, 271 (1997).
70. Helen Dewar, Congress Approves Move of U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem by Mid-1999,
WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1995, at A22; see also Letter from Secretary of State Warren Christopher
to Senator Robert Dole (June 20, 1995) (on file with author) ("My opposition to this legislation
is also strongly rooted on constitutional grounds. The Justice Department's Office of Legal
Counsel has issued an opinion to the White House Counsel concluding that the bill would
unconstitutionally invade exclusive Presidential authorities in the field of foreign affairs.
Because the bill would seek to compel the President to build and open an embassy at a particular
site for foreign political reasons, it is incompatible with the separation of powers under the
60.
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During the George W. Bush administration, Congress enacted the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 " 1 which included
a section addressing U.S. policy toward Jerusalem. This section
included four primary mandates: (1) to immediately relocate the
embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in compliance with the
Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995,72 (2) to limit funding for the U.S.
consulate in Jerusalem unless it is placed under the control of the
Ambassador to Israel, (3) to limit funding for publication of government
documents which do not list Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, and (4) to
allow U.S. citizens born in Jerusalem to have "Jerusalem, Israel" listed
as their place of birth on passports.73 Section 215 ordered reports to be
increased
provided to Congress regarding the U.S. efforts to encourage
74
diplomatic relations between Israel and other countries.
The President's most prominent response to these sections was made
public in his signing statement.75 He declared that he would interpret
Section 214 to be advisory and that it interfered with his constitutional
authority to conduct foreign relations on behalf of the United States.76
President Bush, like President Clinton, also continued to exercise the
national security waiver found in the Jerusalem Embassy Act of 199577
throughout his term in office.7 8 Consistent with Clinton's opinion
regarding Section 214, President Bush also stated that Section 215
matter,
would be subject to his authority to withhold, as a security
79
discretion.
his
at
Congress
from
information
foreign affairs
Throughout President Obama's term, Congress has introduced three
Constitution. This is the same position taken by this and previous Administrations on
comparable legislative efforts to dictate the location of diplomatic and consular facilities.").
71. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-228, § 214,
116 Stat. 1350, 1365-66.

72. Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995 §§ 1-8.
73. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, § 214.
74. Id.§ 215.

75. President George W. Bush, Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization
Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (Sept. 30, 2002), in 2 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES, ADMINISTRATION OF GEORGE W. BUSH, BOOK II, at 1697 (1992). For general

background on the legal significance of Presidential signing statements see ABA, Task Force on
Presidential Signing Statements and the Separation of Powers Doctrine (Aug. 2006),

http://www.americanbar.
org/contentfdam/aba/migrated/leadership/2006/annual/dailyjoumal/20060823144113.authcheck
dam.pdf; Note, Context-Sensitive Deference to PresidentialSigning Statements, 120 HARv.L.
REv. 597 (2006).

76. Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003,
supra note 75, at 1698.
77. Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995, § 7.
78.

U.S. 'Neutrality'on Jerusalem, L.A. TIMES, July 25, 2013, at A16.

79. Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003,
supra note 75, at 1698.
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bills aimed at forcing the President to recognize Jerusalem as the capital
of Israel. These bills include the Jerusalem Embassy and Recognition
Act of 2009,' 0 the Jerusalem Embassy and Recognition Act of 2011,81
and the Jerusalem Embassy and Recognition Act of 2013.82 All three of
these bills have repeated the congressional position stated in the
Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995 with one key distinction." 3 All three of
the Jerusalem Embassy and Recognition Acts include a clause to amend
the 1995 act by revoking the presidential waiver. 84 There has been little
to no reaction from the Obama administration to these proposals.
Despite his lack of response to the Jerusalem Embassy and
Recognition Acts, President Obama has continued, like President
Clinton and President Bush, to exercise the presidential waiver found in
the Jerusalem Embassy Act. 85 As with the George W. Bush
administration, the Department of Justice and the State Department
under President Obama have also responded to a lawsuit brought by the
parents of Menachem Zivotofsky based on the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003. 8866 Zivotofsky seeks to have his
place of birth listed as "Jerusalem, Israel" or "Israel" on his passport,
rather than simply "Jerusalem." 87 The litigation has hinted at a growing
flexibility in U.S. law
and policy toward a final solution to the Israeli88
Palestinian conflict.
B. The Zivotofsky Litigation
Section 214(d) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal
Year 2003 states that "for purposes of the registration of birth,
certification of nationality, or issuance of a passport of a United States
citizen born in the city of Jerusalem, the Secretary shall, upon request of
the citizen or the citizen's legal guardian, record the place of birth as
Israel. 89 On October 17, 2002, Menachem Benyamin Zivotofsky was
born in Shaare Zedek Medical Center, a hospital located within
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Jerusalem Embassy and Recognition Act of 2009, H.R. 3412, 11 1th Cong. (2009).
Jerusalem Embassy and Recognition Act of 2011, S. 1622, 112th Cong. (2011).
Jerusalem Embassy and Recognition Act of 2013, H.R. 104, 113th Cong. (2013).
Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-45, 109 Stat. 398.
H.R. 3412 § 2(c); S. 1622 § 2(c); H.R. 104 § 2(c).

85.

Obama Renews Suspension of Jerusalem Embassy Act, KUWAIT NEWS AGENCY, June

5, 2011, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Obama+renews+suspension+of+Jerusalem+embassy+
act.-a0258083230.
86. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-228, §
214(d), 116 Stat. 1350, 1366.
87. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton (Zivotofsky 1), 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012).
88.

John H. Cushman, Jr., Justices Decline to Say if Jerusalem-Born Americans Can

Claim IsraeliBirthplace,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2012, at Al 7.
89.

Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, § 214(d).
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Jerusalem's 1948 borders to American parents, making him a U.S.
citizen. 90 Zivotofsky's parents filed an application for a U.S. passport
and a consular report of birth abroad (CRBA) requesting that his place
of birth be listed as "Jerusalem, Israel." 91 Based on the policy set forth
in its Foreign Affairs Manual, which codified long-standing Executive
Branch policy, 92 the State Department denied Zivotofsky's request and
issued a passport and a CRBA listing "Jerusalem" as the place of
birth. 93
1. Initial Proceedings: Standing
Zivotofsky filed his claim in the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia in September 2003.94 The Zivotofskys sought a declaratory
judgment against the Secretary and an injunction ordering the Secretary
to issue a CRBA and a passport listing "Jerusalem, Israel" as the place
of birth and ordering embassies to comply with Section 214(d).9 The
Secretary of State, then Colin Powell, asserted that the case was nonjusticiable both because the Zivotofskys had suffered no actual injury
(the designation did not impede his ability to travel) and because the
dispute over Jerusalem was a political question and therefore beyond
the constitutional competence of federal courts to adjudicate. 96 The U.S.
90. Zivotofskyl, 132 S.Ct. at 1425.
91. Id.
92. U.S. Dep't of State, 7 F.A.M. § 1383 (1987), cited in Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
at 10-11, Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Sec'y of State, Nos. 03-1921, 03-2048, 2004 WL
5835212 (D.D.C. Sept. 7, 2004).
93. Zivotofskyl, 132 S.Ct. at 1425-26.
Nos. 03-1921, 0394. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Sec'y of State (Zivotofsky 11),
2048, 2004 WL 5835212, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 7, 2004).
95. Id.
96. Id.at *3 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II1, § 1). Article III of the U.S. Constitution allows
courts to exercise jurisdiction only over "cases and controversies," which requires a plaintiff to
show they have suffered an injury which is concrete and actual or imminent. Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992), cited in Zivotofsky II, Nos. 03-1921, 03-2048, 2004 WL
5835212, at *3 (D.D.C. Sept. 7, 2004). The Secretary argued that the plaintiffs suffered no
actual injury by having only "Jerusalem" listed as their place of birth. They still had valid,
unrestricted passports and the plaintiffs, being infants, were too young to suffer psychological
injury arising from this incident. Under the political question doctrine, the judiciary declines to
review cases "which revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally
committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive Branch."
Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986). The U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. Carr, a voting rights case, is the seminal decision
regarding the political question doctrine. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). In that case, the Supreme Court
ruled that federal courts could not adjudicate cases where the issue to be decided was subject to:
[A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
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Government also relied on President Bush's signing statement in
support of the argument that Section 214(d) was an unconstitutional
encroachment on Executive authority.97 U.S. District Court Judge
Gladys Kessler ultimately agreed that the plaintiffs lacked standing and
that the case was a non-judiciable political question constitutionally
allocated to Congress and the President for resolution." As a nonissue of
justiciable dispute, Judge Kessler did not reach the
99 underlying
status.
Jerusalem's
regulate
to
attempt
Congress's
The Secretary's motion was fundamentally tied to the Bush
Administration's vision for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict:
President Bush, in a June 24, 2002 speech, outlined the United
States vision for a settlement of the conflict consistent with U.N.
Resolutions 242 and 338. The President called for a new
Palestinian leadership and voiced support, under certain
conditions, for the "creation of a Palestinian state whose borders
and certain aspects of its sovereignty will be provisional until
resolved as part of a final settlement in the Middle East."

. .

. the

status of Jerusalem will be addressed in Phase III, during
Permanent Status Negotiations.100
Following the District Court's decision, Zivotofsky appealed. 10 1
Between the decision of the District Court and his appeal, Zivotofsky
amended his claim to request that his passport read "Israel" rather than
"Jerusalem, Israel,' ' 102 arguing that listing only "Israel" would make his
passport indistinguishable from that of any person born in an undisputed
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or
the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made;
or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question.
Id. at 217. Only one of these factors is necessary to conclude that a case presents a political
question. Bancoult v. McNamara, 445 F.3d 427, 432 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing Schneider v.
Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
97. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 6, Zivotofsky II, 2004 WL 5835212 (Nos. 03-1921,
03-2048).
98. Zivotofsky I, 2004 WL 5835212, at *3.
99. Id.
100. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 97, at 9-10.
101. Brief for Appellee, at i, Zivotofsky ex rel. Ari. Z. v. Sec'y of State (Zivotofsky 111),
444 F.3d 614 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (No. 04-5395), 2005 WL 1995890.
102. Id. at615.
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part of Israel. 103 In his brief, the Secretary did not distinguish between
"Israel" and "Jerusalem, Israel," contending that listing "Israel" would
still present a political question because it implicated recognition of
Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem.10 4 As before, he argued that Section
214(d) encroached upon Executive authority and should either be read
as advisory or unconstitutional. 10 5 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia determined that Congress may create an individual
right by enacting a statute, creating an injury that otherwise would not
have existed, effectively rejecting Judge Kessler's standing
determination.' Because of Zivotofsky's amendment to his claim, the
Court of Appeals concluded that Judge Kessler had not resolved the
political question issue.17 As such, the court remanded the case for
08
discovery on the amended claim.'
The U.S. Government again tied its position on Jerusalem to the
resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict noting that "Israel's claim to
sovereignty over Jerusalem is highly contested. The Palestinian
'East Jerusalem as the capital of the future state of
Authority claims
09
Palestine.""
2. Secondary Proceedings: Political Question
Following discovery, the Secretary (then Condoleezza Rice)
expanded the political question argument.'l l Consistent with previous
pleadings, the Secretary first argued that decisions of foreign policy are
103. Id. at 619-20. In 1988, two declarations, one from the PLO and one from the
Kingdom of Jordan, effectively recognized Israel within its 1967 borders. On August 1, 1988,
King Hussein of Jordan conceded that the PLO was the sole legitimate government of the
Palestinian people and renounced Jordanian claims to the territory it controlled between 1948
and 1967. John Kifner, Hussein Surrenders Claims on West Bank to the PLO, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
1, 1988, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1988/08/01/world/hussein-surrendersclaims-west-bank-plo-us-pea ce-plan-jeopardy-internal-tensions.html. On November 15, 1988,
the Palestinian National Council issued the Palestinian Declaration of Independence which,
together with reference to U.N. Resolution 242, effectively renounced Palestinian claims on
territory controlled by Israel before 1967. Palestine Declaration of Independence, G.A. Res.
43/827, Annex III, U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/827 (Nov. 18, 1988), available at
http://www.un.int/wcm/content/site/palestine/ cache/offonce/pid/12353.
104. Brief for Appellee, supra note 101, at 24, 27.
105. Id. (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
106. Zivotofsky II, 444 F.3d at 617 (citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3
(1973)).
107. Id. at619.
108. Id. at 620.
109. Brief for Appellee, supra note 101, at 6.
110. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's Renewed Motion to Dismiss or in
the Alternative for Judgment as a Matter of Law [hereinafter Secretary's Motion to Dismiss], at
7-8, Zivotofsky v. Sec'y of State (Zivotofsky IV), 511 F. Supp. 2d 97 (D.D.C. 2007) (No. 031921).
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constitutionally committed to Congress and the Executive,"'I and this
issue could not be separated from U.S. foreign policy regarding
Israel. 1 2 She also argued that because the court would be required to
make an initial policy determination about U.S. foreign policy in order
to resolve this case, it would require an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion and there were no manageable
judicial standards to resolve the claim. 114 Next, the Secretary argued
that deciding the case would express a lack of respect for the executive
branch 1 5 by calling into question the President's policy of official
neutrality toward Israel's sovereignty over Jerusalem. 1 16 She also
contended that there was a need to adhere to a political decision already
made 1 7 because a change in U.S. policy regarding Jerusalem would
harm foreign relations with Arab nations.118 For the same reasons,
deciding the case could result in embarrassment from differing
pronouncements by multiple branches on the same issue. 119 Based on
these factors, the District Court granted
the Secretary's motion to
120
dismiss on political question grounds.
In the alternative, the Secretary contended that the case would fail on
the merits 121 based on three doctrines: the doctrine of constitutional
avoidance,2 2 the rule against implied repeals, 123 and the tradition 1of
24
judicial deference to the executive branch on foreign affairs matters.
Because the court granted the motion for summary judgment based
on
25
arguments.
these
consider
not
did
it
doctrine,
political question
the In
its appellate brief before the D.C. Circuit, the
government
repeated the connection between Jerusalem and the two-state solution:
"The United States has remained committed to promoting a final and
permanent resolution of these core issues, including the status of
Jerusalem, with the support of the international community, in order to
achieve the goal of two democratic states, Israel and Palestine, living
111. Secretary's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 110, at 9 (citing Schneider v. Kissinger,
412 F.3d 190, 194 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
112.

Id.

113.
114.

Id.at 14.
Baker v.Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).

115.

Id.

116.
117.
118.

Zivotofsky v. Sec'y of State, 511 F. Supp. 2d 97 (D.D.C. 2007).
369 U.S. at 217.
Zivotofsky, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 97.

119. Id.

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 107.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 107.
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side-by-side in peace and security."' 126 Indeed, the brief quoted at length
from President George W. Bush's July 16, 2007 speech:
negotiations must resolve difficult questions and uphold clear
principles. They must ensure that Israel is secure. They must
guarantee that a Palestinian state is viable and contiguous. And
they must lead to a territorial settlement, with mutually agreed
borders reflecting previous lines and current realities, and
mutually agreed adjustments. America is prepared to lead
discussions to address these issues, but they must be resolved by
Palestinians and Israelis, themselves. Resolving these issues
would help show Palestinians a clear way forward. And
ultimately, it could lead to a final peace in the Middle East -- a
permanent end to the conflict, and an
27 agreement on all the issues,
including refugees and Jerusalem.1
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's dismissal based
on thepolitical question doctrine and did not consider the merits of the
case. 12In a concurring opinion, Justice Edwards stated that he would
reach the merits and find § 214(d) to be unconstitutional.1 29 He
contended that this case was justiciable because it is within the power of
the court to interpret and determine the legality of a statute. 130 He
framed the issue differently than the majority: did "enacting § 214(d)..
impermissibly intrud[e] on the President's exclusive power to
recognize foreign sovereigns"?' 3 1 In answer to this question, Justice
Edwards first stated that the Constitution gives the President exclusive
power to recognize foreign sovereigns, 132 and the President's passport
policy in this case is an extension of that power.' 33 Because § 214(d)
uses the term "shall," but it is not used in § 214(a), Congress intended
Edwards
for the § 214(d) to be mandatory. 134 As such, Justice
135
maintained that § 214(d) must be found unconstitutional.

126. Brief for the Appellee, Zivotofsky v. Sec'y of State, 511 F. Supp. 2d 97 (07-5347)
2008 WL 2756232, at *6-7.
127. Id. at 7. On page 10, reference to no Israeli sovereignty over West Bank and Gaza
Strip.
128. Zivotofsky v. Sec'y of State, 571 F.3d 1227, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
129. Id.at 1234.
130. Id. at 1237.
131.

Id.at 1234.

132.
133.
134.

U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
Zivotofsky, 571 F.3d at 1241.
Id. at 1243-44.

135.

Id at 1245.
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3. The U.S. Supreme Court Reverses
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on May 2, 2011.136 Eight
justices rejected lower courts' finding that the political question doctrine
barred adjudication and remanded to the D.C. Circuit to decide whether
section 214(d) was a constitutional exercise of Congress's authority to
regulate the contents of passports, or whether it impermissibly
encroached on37the President's Article II authority to recognize foreign
governments. 1
The U.S. Supreme Court determined that, while there may be a
constitutional commitment to the President to recognize foreign
sovereigns, the Court has the authority to determine the constitutionality
of a statute.' 38 In addition, the Court concluded that because the dispute
ultimately raised an issue of statutory interpretation, federal courts
enjoyed a number of manageable standards for resolving the
question.'39
Justice Sotomayor concurred, but implied that the Court should have
applied more rigorous inquiry to the issue and further questioned the
Court's conclusion that statutes generally fall outside the political
question doctrine's reach. 14 Justice Alito concurred as well,
emphasizing that both Congress and the President enjoy authority over
the contents of passports.141
Justice Breyer dissented, listing four reasons the dispute fell outside
federal courts' competence to resolve. 142 First, the case involved foreign
affairs, an area over which the judiciary was not intended to
participate.143 Second, evaluating the constitutionality of § 214(d) could
require the Court to evaluate foreign policy decisions. 144 Third,
Zivotofsky's interest in receiving a judgment was not great enough to
constitute interference with the political branches.' 5 Finally, the
Executive and Legislative branches have methods to46work out foreign
policy issues without interference from the judiciary. 1
More importantly for purposes of interpreting the U.S. position on
Jerusalem, the U.S. Government's brief before the U.S. Supreme Court
136. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 131 S. Ct. 2897 (2011).
137. Zivotofsky v. Sec'y of State, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1429 (2012); Chris Michel, There's No
Such Thing as a PoliticalQuestion of Statutory Interpretation,123 YALE L.J. 253 (2013).
138. Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1428.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1432, 1435.
141.

Id. at 1436.

142. Id. at 1437.
143. Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).
144. Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1438.
145. Id. at 1440.
146. Id. at 1441.
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marked a departure from the strict two-state view set forth in the lower
court proceedings. Not only did the Government explicitly reject
Palestinian authority over the West Bank and Gaza, it reminded the
court of the historical U.S. position that Jerusalem should be under
international control. "The Executive similarly does not recognize
Palestinian claims to current sovereignty in Jerusalem, the West Bank,
or the Gaza Strip, pending the outcome of these negotiations." 147 It
repeated its uncertainty over the West Bank and Gaza again later in the
brief.14 8 "Jerusalem should be accorded special and separate treatment
from the 49rest of Palestine and should be placed under international
control."1
4. The D.C. Circuit Declares Section 214(d) Unconstitutional
On remand, the parties' arguments focused on the President's Article
II authority to receive ambassadors, 150 and, by extension, the authority
to recognize foreign sovereigns.' 51 By attempting to alter U.S. foreign
policy with regard to Jerusalem's status, the Secretary argued, Congress
had unconstitutionally interfered with the President's authority. 15 The
D.C. Circuit agreed, largely adopting Judge Edward's concurrence in
the political question litigation.
The D.C. Circuit relied on a wealth of historical data suggesting that
the Legislative Branch had previously deferred to the President's
judgment when recognizing foreign governments. 53 Beginning with
President Washington, it found that Congress did not make recognition
decisions even in 1793.'54 The court also noted that Congress
historically would not recognize the existence of a state without
executive recognition. 155 The D.C. Circuit further ruled that Congress
does not enjoy exclusive control over passport matters, 156 and that
passport contents must be informed by the Executive's foreign policy
authority. 157 Because § 214(d) directly conflicts with the Executive's

147.
2011 WL
148.
149.

Brief for Respondent, Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 131 S. Ct. 2897 (2011) (No. 10-699),
4442690, at *2.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 4.

150. U.S. CONST. art. II.
151. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937).
152. Id.
153. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Sec'y of State, 725 F.3d 197 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert.
granted, 134 S.Ct. 1873 (U.S.2014).
154. Executive Power over ForeignAffairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 312-13 (2001).
155. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 212 (1962).
156. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 281 (1981).
157. ld.at298.
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foreign policy, 158 the court invalidated the statute on constitutional
grounds.' 5
With what could only be described as consistent litigation losses for
the Government and the increasing presence of members of Congress in
amici supporting the Zivotofskys as well as the strategic attempt to
persuade certain members of the Court, it is understandable that the
government's brief before the U.S. Supreme Court made far more
extensive reference to the Executive's recogfiition power. But even
given that, there was no obvious reason to include the West Bank and
Gaza as territories similarly lacking a recognized sovereign, and by
extension, similarly undefined political futures.
In the opening pages of its brief, the Government reasserted that "the
Executive does not officially recognize Palestinian claims to current
sovereignty in Jerusalem, the West Bank, or the Gaza Strip, pending the
outcome of these negotiations"' 60 and that "[s]ince the creation of the
State of Israel in 1948, the status and borders of Jerusalem have been a
matter of controversy and disagreement between Israel, the Palestinian
people, and Israel's Arab neighbors."' 161 "People born in Jerusalem, the
West Bank or Gaza today are not allowed to record Palestine
on their
' 62
Israel."'
record
to
allowed
are
they
than
more
any
passports
C. PresidentialSpeeches Since Clinton
It is possible that the transition in the government's pleadings in
Zivotofsky--from a specifically two-state view to an amorphous and
undefined political entity which may or may not include Jerusalem, the
West Bank and Gaza-are purely coincidental, shaped by the need to
respond to the changing constellation of law firms, lawyers, and amici
in the case, or a function of the increasing role of the State Department
as the case moved to the U.S. Supreme Court and implicated the
Executive's powers in a more direct and threatening way. Yet these
changes in the government's pleadings were accompanied by noticeable
shifts in the direction of presidential speeches as well. In 2009,
President Obama's first speech on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
repeated Clinton's and Bush's position that the solution involved two
secure states. In 2011, he ruffled feathers by stating explicitly that the
borders of the two states should be drawn along the 1967 lines, a
statement which implicated the division of Jerusalem. By 2013, Obama
158.
159.
160.
5347), at
161.
162.

Zivotofsky, 725 F.3d at 220.
Id.
Brief for Respondent at 4, Zivotofsky v. Sec'y of State, 2012 WL 4832081 (No. 07*4.
Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 55.
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had loosened this language, referring to Israel's decision that "only
[Israel] can determine what kind of democracy [it] will have" and
quoting Ariel Sharon that "it is impossible to have a Jewish, democratic
state at the same time to control all of Eretz Israel. If we insist on
fulfilling the dream in its entirety, we are liable to lose it all."
1. William J. Clinton
President Clinton oversaw the crest of the feasibility of the two-state
solution between 1993, when Israel and the PLO signed the Oslo
Accords on the White House lawn, and 2000, when the specific terms of
a final agreement appeared in documents drafted at Taba, Egypt.'63 For
most of his presidency, then, Clinton's speeches focused earlier on
praising the Oslo Accords, their drafters, and their intended
implementers, and later on encouraging both sides to return to Oslo's
principles. The Oslo process began breaking down in 1998, and
Clinton's speeches reflected increased urgency at salvaging the Oslo
framework which emphasized Palestinian self-rule in discrete areas
until final status negotiations could conclude. Indeed, in a pair of
speeches delivered to the Israeli and Palestinian governments in
December 1998, Clinton appeared to acknowledge the impending
collapse of Oslo. To the Palestinian National Council he remarked:
I want the people of Israel to know that for many Palestinians, 5
years after Oslo, the benefits of this process remain remote, that
for too many Palestinians lives are hard, jobs are scarce,
prospects are uncertain, and personal grief is great. I know that
tremendous pain remains as a result of losses suffered from
violence, the separation of families, the restrictions on the
movement of people and goods. I understand your concerns
about settlement activity, land confiscation, and home
demolitions.' 64
To the Israelis:
Of course, there have been setbacks, more misunderstandings,
more disagreements, more provocations, more acts of violence.
You feel Palestinians should prove in word and deed that their
intentions have actually changed, as you redeploy from land on
163. At that point, the Israeli government led by Ehud Barak was a lame duck and all sides
knew that the deal's implementation depended on the unlikely willingness of the subsequent
Israeli government.
164. Bill Clinton Administration: Speech to the Palestine National Council & Other
Organizations (Dec. 14, 1998), http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/USPalestinian
"Israel/Clinton Pales3.html.
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which65tears and blood have been shed, and you are right to feel
that.1
President Clinton's final official speech on the conflict took place at
the Israeli Policy Forum on January 7, 2001.166 He delivered the speech
nearly six months into the second Palestinian intifada, a result of the
failed final status talks concluded at Taba. 167 The speech was emphatic
as to two states as the solution to the conflict.' 68 Clinton put forth five
parameters intended to bring the two parties closer to a permanent
settlement.169 First, there must be a sovereign Palestinian state including
Gaza and most of the West Bank.170 Second, Palestinian refugees must
be provided with a permanent place to live, either in a new Palestinian
homeland or elsewhere in the world, and they should be compensated
by the international community.' 7 1 Third, Israel must have guarantees of
security which should be enforced by an "international presence" in the
Jordan Valley. 172 Fourth, Jerusalem, because of its importance to both
parties, 173 should be "open and undivided" and act as the capital for
both states. 174 Clinton indicated that the Arab portions of Jerusalem
should belong to the Palestinians and the Jewish portions should belong
to Israel. 75 Sites which are holy to both sides should be accessible to
everyone.1 76 Fifth, an agreement must be accompanied by a decision on
both sides to end the conflict and uphold all compromises.
He counseled the Palestinians to negotiate rather than resist through
violence 78 and he reminded the Israelis that the homeland they returned to
was not vacant, so they would need to compromise for peace. 1798 Clinton
0
pledged to spend his remaining days in office assisting the parties'
165. Bill Clinton: Speech to the People of Israel (Dec. 13, 1998), http://www.jewishvirtual
library.org/jsource/US-Israel/ClintonIsrael3 1.html.
166. William J. Clinton, President of the United States, Speech on Mideast Peace
Parameters

(Jan.

7,

2001)

(transcript

available

at

http://usembassy-

israel.org.il/publish/peace/archives/2001/j anuary/meO108b.html).
167. Id. 16.
168.

at 3.
169.

John Diamond, Clinton: For Peace,Land Must be Divided, Cfl. TRIB., Jan. 8, 2001,

Supra note 166, 46.

170.

Id.

171.

Id.

48.

50-51.

172. Id. 54.
173. Id. 55.
174. Id. 56.
175. Id.

176. Id.
177.

Id.

178.

Id. 69.

58.

179.

Id.

71.

180. Id. 74.
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2. George W. Bush
President Bush's first speech related to the conflict was intertwined
with the U.S. reaction to the September 11,2001 attacks. 18' Speaking at
the United Nations on November 10, 2001, he denounced terrorism in
general and nations who supported any kind of assistance to terrorist
groups. 182 He nevertheless adopted Clinton's perspective on resolution
of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 183 President Bush supported "two statesIsrael and Palestine" and vowed to bring the parties back to the
negotiating table.' 84 .
President Bush's first speech dedicated specifically to Israel/Palestine
took place in the Rose Garden on June 24, 2002. In that speech, he
primarily called for a change in Palestinian leadership. 18 5 Bush proposed
that the United States and other nations and international institutionswhat became known as the Quartet of the United States, the European
Union, the United Nations, and Russia-assist the Palestinians in creating
a new constitution, organize elections, and establish a judicial system as
well as contribute economically to the
86 development of the West Bank and
Gaza and aid Palestinian refugees.'
Bush repeated messages to the Palestinians and the Israelis that gave
generally characterized Executive statements about the conflict. He
demanded that Palestinians end terrorist activities and that Israelis end
settlement building and land confiscation. 187 Echoing Clinton, he stated
that a settlement should be based on U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338,188
suggesting that the borders between Israel and Jordan as of May 1967
serve as the base line for borders between Israel and Palestine.' 89 He also
reminded Israelis that Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, and peace with
Lebanon and90 Syria would necessarily accompany final status
negotiations.'
181. George W. Bush, President of the United States, Speech to United Nations (Nov. 10,
2010) (text available from the CNN website at http://edition.cnn.com/2001iUS/11/10/
ret.bush.un.transcript/index.html [hereinafer Speech to United Nations].
182. Id.
183. Serge Schmemann, Arafat Thankful for Bush Remark About 'Palestine,' N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 12, 2001, at A6.
184. Speech to United Nations, supra note 181.
185. George W. Bush, President of the United States, President Bush Calls for New
Palestinian Leadership (June 24, 2002) (text available from the archives of the White House
website at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020624-3.
html); Karen DeYoung, PresidentOutlines Vision for Mideast; Palestinian Statehood Depends
on Arafat's Removal, Bush Says, WASH. POST, June 25, 2002, at Al.
8, 10.
186. President Bush Calls for New Palestinian Leadership, supra note 185,
187. Id. 11, 17, 20.
188.

Id.

189. DeYoung, supra note 185.
190. President Bush Calls for New Palestinian Leadership, supra note 185, 121.
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On November 27, 2007 President Bush spoke at the Annapolis
Conference, opening renewed negotiations between Israel and the
Palestinian Authority.' 9' The speech repeated the U.S. position that two
states must form the basis of a final solution.'
As in his 2002
speech, 193 President Bush called on the Palestinians to create a just
nation and denounce terrorism.' 94 Likewise, he called on the Israelis to
end settlement activities and emphasized the potential economic gains
accompanying a prosperous Palestine. 95 Similarly, President Bush
called on the international community, including other Arab states, to
support Israel and Palestine in both their internal affairs, as well as in
creating positive connections with other nations.' 96 He also pledged
support from the United States' 9 7 and his personal support, as Clinton
did, 198 for his remaining time in office. 19 9
President Bush addressed the Knesset on May 17, 2008200 in

recognition of the 60th anniversary of Israel's founding, 01 as well as
the anniversary of President Truman's recognition of Israel. 2°2 He
predicted both Israel and a Palestinian state living in peaceful,
democratic state as well as tolerance and freedom throughout the
Middle East.2 03 He compared his vision with the reality of Europe and
Japan's peace and prosperity in the
20 4six decades following World War II,
despite its destruction and horror.
Six months later, President Bush spoke at the Saban Forum in
Washington, D.C. 20 5 Although the majority of this speech addressed the
Middle East in general, the President did make some brief comments
191. George W. Bush, President of the United States, President Bush Attends Annapolis
Conference (Nov. 27, 2007) (text available from the archives of the White House website at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/1 1/20071127-2.html).
192. Id. 13.
193. President Bush Calls for New Palestinian Leadership, supra note 185, 4.
194. Presi dent Bush Attends Annapolis Conference, supra note 191, 7 24.
195. 1d. 125.
196. Id. 26-27.
197. Id. 7 28, 31.
198. Speech on Mideast Peace Parameters, supra note 169, 74.
199. President Bush Attends Annapolis Conference, supra note 191, 31.
200. George W. Bush, President of the United States, Prepared Text of Bush's Knesset
Speech, Remarks by the President to Members of the Knesset (May 15, 2008), in Wall Street
Journal, May 2008, at website at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121083798995894943.html.
201. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, The Middle East in the Year 2068? Some Presidential
Prognostications,N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2008, at A 12.
202. Prepared Text of Bush's Knesset Speech, supra note 200, 4.
203. Id. 25, 26.
204. Id. 28.
205. George W. Bush, President of the United States, President Bush Attends Saban
Forum 2008 (Dec. 5, 2008), in The White House website, Dec. 2008, at http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/1 2/20081205-8.html.
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about the Arab-Israeli conflict. 206 He made clear that the United States
would defend its interests and allies from hostile actions in the Middle
East.207 He once again confirmed his commitment to the two-state
solution, 20 8 denounced terrorism,2°9 and praised the progress 2made
by
10
both parties at negotiations begun at the Annapolis Conference.
3. Barack Obama
211
During his June 4, 2009 speech at Cairo University in Egypt,
President Obama identified the Arab-Israeli conflict as one of the major
sources of tension in the Middle East. 212 Like President Bush before
him, 213 he declared the bond between the United States and Israel to be
unbreakable. 214 He also declared that threats toward Israel were
wrong,215 and Palestinians must not use violent tactics against Israel. 216
He described the situation of the Palestinian people as "intolerable"217
and recognized their right to exist as equal to Israel's. 218 President
Obama called on Israel to halt settlement activities and allow
Palestinians to develop their own society.2 19 He called on the Arab
nations to recognize Israel's legitimacy and aid Palestinians. 22 0 Finally,
like both President Clinton22 ' and Bush,222 President Obama supported
the two-state solution 223 to the Arab-Israeli
conflict and pledged his
2 24
personal assistance to aid in the outcome.
On May 19, 2011, President Obama spoke in Washington, D.C.
about a range of issues facing the United States with respect to its
interests in the Middle East and North Africa.2 2 5 Despite setbacks in
206.

Id. 79 31-35, 41.

207. Id 16.
208.

Id. 31.

209. Id. 32.
210. Id. 35.
211. Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the President on a New
Beginning (June 4, 2009), in The White House website, June 2009, at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-cairo-university-6-04-09.
212. Id. 29.
213. Prepared Text of Bush's Knesset Speech, supra note 200, 5.
214. Remarks by the President on a New Beginning, supra note 211, 30.
215. Id. 31.
216. Id. 35.
217. Id. 32.
218. Id. 37.
219. Id. 37-38.
220. Id. 39.
221. Speech on Mideast Peace Parameters, supra note 169, 7 48, 74.
222. President Bush Attends Annapolis Conference, supra note 191, 31.
223. Remarks by the President on a New Beginning, supra note 211, 33
224. Id. 34.
225. Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the President on the
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talks between the parties including the continuation of settlement
activities by the Israelis, 236 President Obama stated that he believed
peace was still possible. 22 7 He insisted that Palestine must not deny
Israel's right to exist, and as in his speech in Cairo, 228 called for an end
to Palestinian violence. 2 2 President Obama again 23° supported separate
Israeli and Palestinian states as the solution for peace.
He indicated
that the borders should be based on the lines held in 1967,232 eliciting a
sharply negative response from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu. 3 This peace should be accompanied by the gradual
removal of the Israeli military from occupied areas. 2 34 He also
recognized that both parties would need to come
235 to agreement about the
status of Jerusalem and Palestinian refugees.
In a pair of speeches at the United Nations delivered in 2010 and
2011, Obama both repeated his support for the two-state solution and
directed that the shape of that solution must be fashioned by the parties
themselves. 236 While the latter statement was consistent with his May
2011 speech and a renewed U.S. effort to bring the parties back to the
negotiating table, it was more specifically directed at the Palestinian bid
for statehood at the United Nations. While Obama did not explicitly
mention that he would instruct a veto at the Security Council, he noted
that
Peace will not come through statements and resolutions at the
United Nations -- if it were that easy, it would have been
accomplished by now. Ultimately, it is the Israelis and the
Palestinians who must live side by side. Ultimately, it is the
Israelis and the Palestinians -- not us - who must reach

Middle East and North Africa (May 19, 2011), in The White House website, May 2011, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/19/remarks-president-middle-east-and-northafrica.
226. Id. 58.
227. Id. 9958-59.
228. Remarks by the President on a New Beginning, supranote 211, 35.
229. Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa, supra note 225, 60.
230. Remarks by the President on a New Beginning, supra note 211, 9 33.
231. Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa, supra note 225, 64.
232. Id. 965.
233. Joby Warrick & Joel Greenberg, Netanyahu Balks as Obama Speech Invokes '67
Borders, WASH. POST, May 20, 2011, at A 1l.
234.
235.

Id.
Id.

236. Scott Wilson, At UN., Obama's Rejection of Palestinian Bid Offers Strongest
Embrace of Israel, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national
/national-security/at-un-obamas-rejection-of-palestinian-bid-offers-strongest-embrace-of-israe/
2011/ 09/2 1/gIQAIK2DmK-story.html.
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agreement on the issues that divide them: on borders and on
security, on refugees and Jerusalem.23 7

On March 21, 2013, President Obama spoke at the Jerusalem
International Convention Center.238 He opened by praising the
prosperity of the Israeli people 239 despite their present and historical
suffering, 240 and mentioned the immediate U.S. recognition of Israel by
242
Unlike
President Truman, 241 just as President Bush did in 2008.
focused
primarily
were
comments
Bush,
whose
and
Clinton
Presidents
towards the actions of national leaders, President Obama chose to direct
his comments toward young Israelis, 243 encouraging them to push their
leaders to make peace.
While Obama again mentioned "two states for two peoples" as his
belief about where negotiations must lead, he made no mention of the
1967 armistice lines between Israel and Jordan and he placed emphasis
on the alternative possibility that Israel may become a state with a much
larger Arab population: "only you can determine what kind of
democracy you will have,' 245 implying that Israel cannot continue
settlement activities and control of the occupied territories and remain a
Jewish majority democracy. 246 President Obama also quoted former
Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon: "it is impossible to have a Jewish
democratic state, and at the same time to control all of Eretz Israel. If
we insist on fulfilling the dream in its entirety, we are liable to lose it
all.",247 Indeed, Obama's call for two-states notwithstanding, the tone of
his remarks was decidedly ecumenical:
237. Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks of President Obama in Address to the
U.N. General Assembly (Sept. 21, 2011), in The White House website, Sept. 2011, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/21/remarks-president-obama-address-unite
d-nations-general-assembly; Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks of
President Obama in Address to the U.N. General Assembly (Sept. 23, 2010), in The White
House website, Sept. 2010, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/09/23/remarkspresident-unite d-nations-general-assembly.
238. Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks of President Barack Obama
to the People of Israel (Mar. 21, 2013), in The White House website, Mar. 2013, at
house.gov/the-press-office/2013/03/2 1/remarks-president-barack-obamahttp://www.white
people-israel.
239. Id. 15.
240. Id.7 7-16.
241. Id. 18.
242. Prepared Text of Bush's Knesset Speech, supra note 200, 4.
243.

Id.

24.

244. Id. 61.
245. Id. 50.
246.

Max Fisher, How Obama Just Refrained the Israel-PalestineConflict, WASH. POST,

Mar. 21, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/03/21/how-obamajust-reframed-the-israel-palestine-conflict/.
247. Remarks of President Barack Obama to the People of Israel, supra note 238, 51.
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That's where peace begins, not just in the plans of leaders, but in
the hearts of people; not just in some carefully designed process,
but in the daily connections, that sense of empathy that takes
place among those who live together in this land and in this
sacred city of Jerusalem.248
III. THE

SHIFT IN THE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT FOR SELFDETERMINATION FROM SOVEREIGNTY TO CIVIL RIGHTS

It is not possible at this time to tie with firm evidence the subtle
shifts in U.S. policy arguably revealed in the Zivotofsky litigation and
presidential speeches with changes on the ground, but those changes are
certainly under way. Palestinians in Gaza, the West Bank, and
Jerusalem are increasingly adopting Hebrew into their educational
curricula; Arab Jerusalem residents are increasingly electing to attend
Israeli universities; East Jerusalem itself is undergoing a process of
"Israelization" which diminishes its feasibility as a political capital for a
future Palestinian state; the Palestinian leadership, after a failed effort at
U.N. recognition in 2011, increasingly discuss the desirability of
"exiting" the Oslo peace process; and, the Israeli settlement of Ma'ale
Adumim, which Israel has persistently stated it will never relinquish,
effectively obstructs the possibility for a viable Palestinian state. A
Palestinian civil rights movement that emphasizes equality between
Arabs and Jews living under Israeli control is slowly but surely
displacing the movement historically led in the name of sovereignty and
membership in the community of nations.
A. The Israelizationof East Jerusalem
East Jerusalemites increasingly elect Israeli citizenship, vote in
Jerusalem municipal elections, and elect places in Israeli universities
trends which move against the city's socially-250 divided past.241
Approximately 801,000 people live in Jerusalem. Of these, about
35% are Palestinian and 62% are Jewish. 25' Although Palestinians
are a minority in Jerusalem, the growth rate of the Palestinian
population has been higher
than that of the Jewish population over
25
the last several years. 2
248. Id. 58.
249. See generally ROGER FRIEDLAND & RICHARD HECHT, To RULE JERUSALEM (1996).
250. Press Release, CENT. BUREAU OF STATISTICS, Selected Data on the Occasion of
Jerusalem Day (May 16, 2012), http://www.cbs.gov.il/hodaot2Ol2n/I 1 2_126e.pdf.
251. Id.
252. Maya Choshen & Michael Korach, Jerusalem: Facts and Trends 2011,
JERUSALEM INST. FOR ISRAEL STUD., http://jiis.org/.upload/facts-201 1-eng-internet.pdf.
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1. Education
Immediately following the Six-Day War and Israel's annexation
of East Jerusalem, Arab educators and parents refused the
imposition of Israeli curricula in their schools. 253 After a two-year
strike, the Israeli government allowed Jordanian, later Palestinian,
curricula to be taught in Jerusalem's Arab schools. 254 Despite these
long-standing features of education in the Arab parts of Jerusalem,
teachers, and students are increasingly turning to the Israeli
education system 255 because they believe it will lead to better
opportunities in the long run.256
In 2013, eligibility for bagrut-Israeli matriculation-increased
5% over the previous five years among Arab students, a trend
explained by a number of phenomena relevant to the conflict
generally. 257 Since the Israeli government began building its
security barrier in 2002, it has become increasingly difficult to
travel to Arab universities outside Jerusalem; it is faster and simpler
258
to attend Israeli universities on the Jerusalem side of the barrier.
The extra courses required for students studying Palestinian
259
curricula to prepare for Israeli matriculation exams are expensive.
Demand from parents and students has led Jerusalem city officials
to implement Israeli curriculum as an option in some East
Jerusalem schools to eliminate the need for extra courses. 2 60 The
Israeli curriculum is considered by some to be26 1more valuable to
gain opportunities for jobs and higher education.
This trend is also reflected in the expansion of Hebrew language
education not only in East Jerusalem, but in schools in the West
262
Bank and Gaza. Hebrew and Arabic are both Semitic languages.
253. Nir Hasson, A Surprising Process of 'Israelization' Is Taking Place among
Palestinians in East Jerusalem, HAARETZ, Dec. 29, 2012, http://www.haaretz.com/
weekend/magazine/a-surprising-process-of-israelization-is-taking-place-among-palestini
ans-in-east-jerusalem.premium- 1.490367.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Ruth Eglash, Israeli Curriculum Is Another Fault Line in East Jerusalem,
WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2013, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1 P2-35132028.html.
257. Sharon Udasin, Matriculation Rates Increase by 3.5 Percent in Past 5 Years,
Aug. 22, 2013, http://www.jpost.com/National-News/BagrutJERUSALEM POST,
matriculat ion-rates-jump-by-35-percent-in-past-5-years-323806.
258.

Holy City Twist: Arabs Moving into Jewish Areas, JERUSALEM POST, July 9,

http://www.jpost.com/Israel/Holy-City-twist-Arabs-moving-into-Jewish-areas
2009,
[hereinafter Holy City Twist]; see also Hasson, supra note 253.
259. Eglash, supra note 256.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Jodi Rudoren, Hamas-Run Schools Set Out to Teach 'the Language of the
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They share many word roots and grammatical principles.2 6 3 Many
words sound the same and Arabic grammar is more difficult than
Hebrew grammar, so Hebrew is fairly easy to learn for Arabic
speakers.
While Hebrew has not yet become officially sanctioned
by the Palestinian Ministry of Education (it is officially offered in
Gaza), private schools in the West Bank are expanding Hebrew
language offerings. 26 5 At the Mohammed bin Rashid Bin AlMaktoum School near Ramallah, 120 out of 600 students enrolled in
its Hebrew courses. 266 There are also schools in East Jerusalem
which are now offering26 Israeli
curriculum at the encouragement of
7
the Israeli government.
For Palestinians inside or outside of Jerusalem, knowledge of
Hebrew is pursued for both pragmatic and political reasons.
Degrees from Arab universities are not always recognized in Israel,
forcing the degree holders to take lower-paying jobs in Gaza and
the West Bank rather than in Israel.2 6 8 Students who take the
Palestinian matriculation exam, the tawjih, but wish to study at
Israeli universities must undergo an additional year of education to
demonstrate adequate skills in Hebrew. 269 By learning Hebrew,
students in East Jerusalem can choose to prepare for the bagrut
instead and bypass the extra year of study. 270 Because Israel is more
technologically developed 27 1 and its education system places more
emphasis on math and science, 2 72 this is particularly beneficial for
students who are interested in science and medicine.2 7 3 Those who
elect to continue on the Palestinian course of study will still have
Enemy,' N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2012, at A7.

263.
264.

Id.
Id.

265. Diana Atallah, West Bank Hebrew Language Study Is Growing, JERUSALEM
POST, Mar. 27, 2013, http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/West-Bank-Hebrew-languagestudy-is-growing-307880.
266.

Id.

267. Eglash, supra note 256; Kate Shuttleworth, For Arabs in Israel, Curriculum
Choice
Is
Politically
Charged,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Jan.
19,
2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
0 1/20/world/middleeast/for-arabs-in-israel-curriculum-

choice-is-politically-charged.htm l?_r=0.
268. Shuttleworth, supra note 267.
269. Id.
270.

Id.

271. Christa Case Bryant, The Latest Hot Language Among Palestiniansin Gaza?
Hebrew, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 18, 2013, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/
Middle-East/2013/0318/The-latest-hot-language-among-Palestinians-in-Gaza-Hebrew.
272.

Eglash, supra note 256.

273.

Shuttleworth, supra note 267.
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more job opportunities over the Israeli border if they can
communicate in Hebrew.274
Politically, the expansion of Hebrew language proficiency
enhances Palestinians' access to information about developments in
Israel and for those committed to it, serves a peace promoting
purpose. 27 While Arabic media outlets translate Hebrew language
news services, the information is filtered and shaped, limiting the
ability for Palestinians
to listen to first-hand accounts of Israeli
276
attitudes.
and
actions
2. Housing and Water
Housing and utilities are a major problem for the residents of
East Jerusalem. 277 Without documentation of property ownership,
residents may not obtain a building permit; without a permit
residents may be denied utilities or have their homes destroyed.27 8
Housing density is higher in Arab households than in Jewish ones,
almost double in 2009.279 Housing costs in the eastern part of the
city are high 280 and it is inconvenient to travel from East Jerusalem
to the rest of the city. 281 East Jerusalem neig.hborhoods outside the
security fence are particularly disadvantaged.
As a result, many Arab residents have begun to move into
Jewish neighborhoods in other parts of Jerusalem. 283 There, housing
costs are lower and it is easier to travel to jobs, schools, and other
places. 284 The mayor of Jerusalem, Nir Barkat, has created a system
allowing residents who cannot prove ownership of land to obtain a
temporary permit which becomes permanent after twenty years of
undisputed ownership. 285 As a result, demolitions in East Jerusalem

274.

Id.

275. Hadid, Hamas Encourages Study of Hebrew in Gaza City; the Territory's
Rulers Want Palestinian University Students to Know Their Enemy's Language, L.A.

TIMES, Jan. 13, 2013, available at LexisAdvance.
276. Atallah, supra note 265.
277. Hasson, supra note 253.
278.

Id.

279.

Choshen & Korach, supra note 252.

280. Dina Kraft, Arabs Moving to Jewish Jerusalem, JEWISH TELEGRAPHIC AGENCY,
Jan. 24, 2008, http://www.jta.org/2008/01/24/news-opinion/israel-middle-east/arabs-

movi ng-to-jewish-jerusalem.
281. Holy City Twist, supra note 258.
282. Kraft, supra note 280.
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are lower than in previous years 2 86 and housing density among Arab
households has decreased. 7 Hagihon, Jerusalem's water provider,
indicated that it would continue laying more pipes and installing
more water meters in East Jerusalem. 8g This will provide residents
with a9 more reliable source of water 289 and generate revenue for the
2
city. 0
3. Health
Until the 1990s, East Jerusalem's healthcare services lagged far
behind the rest of the city in terms of both quality and access. 29 1 In
January 1995, the National Health Insurance Law went into effect;
it required all residents and citizens to become a member of a
health-care organization. 292 Health-care organizations must provide
the following services: medical diagnosis and treatment at clinics
and at home, preventative medicine and health education,
hospitalization, surgery and transplant, preventative dental care for
children, first aid and transportation to a clinic or hospital, medical
services at the workplace, treatment for drug and alcohol abuse,
medical equipment and appliances, obstetrics and fertility
treatments, treatment of injuries caused by violence, medications,
293
treatment of chronic diseases, and paramedical services.
Following the enactment of this law, there was a large increase
in both the number and quality of medical clinics and services
available in East Jerusalem. Many clinics now have their own
advanced medical equipment and transportation services. 294 They
also have a close connection with the neighborhoods they service,
going out of their way to ensure that residents seek out proper
preventative care.
286.

Tal Kra-Oz, How Nir Barkat's Lack of Poetry Brought Jerusalem Back from

the Dead, TABLET MAG.,

July 8,

2013,

politics/] 36 733/nir-barkat-jerusalem.
287. Press Release, CENT. BUREAU OF

http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-

STATISTICS,
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Household Head (2013), http://wwwl.cbs.gov.il/shnaton64/st05_22.pdf.
288.
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(2014),

available at

http://www. hagihon.co.il/RichText/GeneralPage.aspx?nodeld= 140.
289. Hasson, supra note 253.
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ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF., NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE (1995),

available at http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFA-Archive/1998/Pages/National%2OHealth%20
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As a result, health quality indices in East Jerusalem have risen
significantly-from 74 in 2009 to 87 in 2012-making them almost
equal with the national average. 296 Improvements in health care
quality are also evidenced by a sharp decrease in mortality rate
among Arab residents. 297 The mortality rate dropped from 4.5
deaths er 1,000 persons in the 1980s to 2.9 deaths per person in the
2000s.B8 By contrast the decrease in the mortality rate of the Jewish
population was much more moderate, falling from 5.9 deaths per
1,000 persons in the 1980s to 5.2 deaths per 1,000 persons in the
2000s.
4. Arab Migration into West Jerusalem and Israeli Naturalization
Jerusalem's Arabs are not only moving to Jewish neighborhoods,
increasing numbers are also seeking Israeli citizenship.300 When
East Jerusalem was annexed, the Palestinians living there were
granted only residency, not citizenship; however, they have the
right to apply for Israeli citizenship. 30 1 Permanent residency status
denies Jerusalem's Arabs many rights, particularly the right to live
wherever they would like in Israel.30 2 If an Arab resident leaves
Jerusalem for more than seven years, the government may revoke
her residency permit 3 03 and she may lose her home. 3 (4 Israeli
citizenship allows Arabs to move within Israel and Jerusalem 30 5 and
to vote in national elections. 30 6 Israeli citizens may not travel to all
parts of the West Bank, only those areas under Israeli or joint
Israeli and Palestinian control.
A 2011 poll of East Jerusalem residents reported that 35% of
East Jerusalem residents would prefer to become Israeli citizens,
30% would choose Palestine, and 35% either declined to answer or
did not know. 308 In addition, 40% of Palestinians in East Jerusalem
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

Id.
Choshen & Korach, supra note 252.
Id.
Id.
Hasson, supra note 253.
Id.

302.
303.

Id.
Linda Gradstein, East Jerusalem'sIdentity Crisis, JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 10,

2012, http://www.jpost.com/In-Jerusalem/Features/East-Jerusalems-identity-crisis.
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305. Kraft, supra note 280.
306. Hasson, supra note 253.
307. Gradstein, supra note 303.
308. David Pollock, What Do the Arabs of East Jerusalem Really Want?, WASH.
INST. FOR NEAR E. POL'Y, Sept. 7, 2011, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-
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said they would move in order to become Israeli citizens, and even
a larger number of Palestinians living in refugee camps would
choose Israeli citizenship. 30 9 These results confirm the results of a
similarpoll
conducted for the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations in
31
2010. 1
The impetus to Israeli citizenship among these groups is driven
by pragmatic advantages in education, health care, and basic
services, notwithstanding formal and informal forms of
discrimination against Arabs in Israeli society. 3 11 Arabs who have
moved into Jewish neighborhoods have experienced resistance to
their presence. 312 Yet their security situation in East Jerusalem is
just as tenuous; the state funds private security guards to protect
Jewish settlers in areas of East Jerusalem; Arabs in the same
neighborhoods are not so protected.3 13
Beginning in 2002, Israel began constructing a set of concrete walls,
ditches and fences (the "separation barrier") separating its territory and
settlements from Arab population centers. 314 The separation barrier
winds through Arab East Jerusalem and includes some major Arab
neighborhoods but excludes others. 315 Palestinians living outside the
316
wall are far more deprived relative to "Israel-side" Jerusalemites.
There are approximately 60,000 Palestinian residents of East
Jerusalem living outside the separation wall.317 They typically do
not have access to basic services from the city, and the Palestinian
Authority may not enter the area318to provide them with security or
services under the Oslo Accords.
The Israeli government initially began building the fence to
provide security from attacks originating from the West Bank.319
309.
310.

Id.
David Pollock, Poll Shows 40 Percent of Jerusalem Arabs Prefer Israel to a

PalestinianState, WASH. INST. FOR NEAR E. POL'Y, Nov. 2, 2011, http://www.washington
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Sept. 22, 2005, http://www.miflah.org/display.cfm?Docld=8504&Categoryld=5.
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316. Hasson, supra note 253.
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However, Israeli security forces have recently become concerned
that completion of the wall will actually increase security
problems. 32° They believe that completely ending illegal entry of
Palestinians into Jerusalem may destabilize the Palestinian economy
and lead to escalating unrest. 321 As a result, security forces are
considering granting more work permits as the wall is completed.322
There is no consensus on what the changes in East Jerusalem will
mean for the city as a whole although the increasing integration
between East and West Jerusalem323
threatens the feasibility of neatly
areas.
Jewish
and
Arab
separating
B. "Exiting" Oslo
The Oslo Accords function in practice if not in form as an
international treaty, even though they are officially a "Declaration of
Principles" and they regulate the relationship between parties clearly
authorized to enter into a treaty (Israel, Russia, and the United States)
and a party whose status under international law is less clear. 324 Unlike
many treaties, the Oslo Accords themselves provide no mechanism for
termination, although assuming the parties formed a treaty to which the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is applicable, either side may
claim that a material breach of treaty provisions "entitles the other to
invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending
its operation in whole or in part."325 Indeed, this is more or less what
both have asserted about the other-Israel arguing that the Palestinians
have breached their promises with respect to Israeli security and the
Palestinians arguing that Israel has not only failed to stop expropriating
land, but has accelerated settlement and built a barrier deep into
Palestinian territory.
Legal and scholarly analysis of the Oslo Accords have produced
a
326
wide range of conclusions as to what they originally intended. Those
Violence, BBC MONITORING MIDDLE E., Jan. 22, 2014, available at http://electronic
intifada.net/content/another-reason-build-fence-separating-israel-west-bank-will-help-pr
event-attacks-such.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Holy City Twist, supra note 258.
324.
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185, 186 (2011).
325. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 60, May 23, 1969.
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conclusions are invariably shaped by the viewpoints of their analysts.
Israeli opponents viewed Oslo as a Trojan horse giving legitimacy to a
sworn enemy of Israel and a base from which the PLO could attack as it
had from Jordan and Lebanon. 327 Palestinian opponents saw Oslo as a
massive surrender of rights established under a long line of U.N.
General Assembly Resolutions and an agreement which privileged
Israeli security over the human cost of military occupation. 328 Certainly,
the Accords supported the view taken by the United States (although not
until 2000) that the eventual resolution was two sovereign states, but the
document itself never promised that, referring obliquely to U.N.
Resolutions 242 and 338 which themselves were vaguely worded so329as
to accommodate the conflicting interests they were drafted to reflect.
Whatever the beginning and end of Oslo-and there is widespread
agreement that the Oslo project not only failed but may have never even
began-it can be safely stated that it envisioned segregated Israeli and
Palestinian populations living under political authorities to which each
was accountable. 330 Between 2009 and 2011, the Palestinian Authority
attempted to have the two-state vision implied by Oslo made explicit
through admission of Palestine as a state to the United Nations with the
pre-June 6, 1967 armistice lines between Jordan and Israel as the
borders of the new state, a position taken by the PLO in 1988.
Palestine's effort failed, largely because of a promised veto by the
United States, who, as the aforementioned speech by Obama stated, that
two states need to be achieved by bilateral negotiations.
Since that failure, the Palestinian leadership has put in place
alternatives to statehood under international law. First, it has sketched
out the possibility of withdrawing from the Oslo Accords, undertaking a
widespread non-violent protest movement akin to those undertaken
between 1936 and 1939, and dissolving the Palestinian Administration
and altering the mandate of the PLO.3 Saeb Erakat, the Palestinians'
chief negotiator, raised the one state solution as an alternative
CASE W. RESERVE J. INT'L L. 253, 260 (1999). See generally Louis Rene Beres, Why the Oslo
Accords Should Be Abrogated by Israel, 12 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 267 (1997).

327.
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328. Adam Hanieh, The Oslo Illusion: The Historical Accords between Palestine and
Israel, GLOBAL RES., June 3, 2013, http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-oslo-illusion-the-historical-

accords-between-palestine-and-israel/5337332.
329. Raef Zreik, A One-State Solution? From a "Struggle unto Death" to "Master-Slave"
Dialectics, 17 SOC. IDENTITIES 793, 796 (2011).

330. Hallward, supra note 324.
331. Harriet Sherwood, Palestinian Leadership Considers Withdrawing from the Oslo
Accords, GUARDIAN, Sept. 19 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/19/palestinianleadership-oslo-accords; SECTION 9 - PALESTINIAN MESSAGING AND IMPLEMENTATION, THE
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possibility with former U.S. Senator George Mitchell, President
Obama's envoy to the parties, as early as 2009. Indeed, there is some
evidence that among younger Palestinians, a civil rights movement
approach to the conflict-with a single political entity as its aim is far
more likely to achieve Oslo's stated purpose of "a just, lasting and
comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation . ...
Given the unpredictable nature of Palestinian self-determination
movements and aims-the 1987 intifada was spontaneous and
amorphous-it is not clear when top-level bureaucratic frustration and
bottom-up movements for equal rights under Israeli rule might coalesce.
C. The Problem of Ma 'ale Adumim
1. Dividing the West Bank and East Jerusalem
1973 and
Ma'ale Adumim is an Israeli settlement established around
3 34
1977.
in
government
Israeli
the
by
given official recognition

0,8da

n, e4sI
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335

It is located roughly three miles east of Jerusalem, 336 in territory
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captured by Israel in 1967.337 It started as a small settlement of about
339
2,000 residents 338 and has expanded to approximately 39,000 today.
Although it is only one of many settlements in the area immediately
surrounding Jerusalem, it is situated so as to both cut off Palestinian
access to East Jerusalem and to disrupt territorial contiguity between the
northern and southern parts of the West Bank. 340 The boundaries of
Ma'ale Adumim are oddly shaped, and take up more than twice the
space of the actual settlement. 3 The expansive boundaries, especially
when combined with the E-1 area, effectively separate the large
Palestinian cities of Bethlehem and Ramallah, forcing Palestinians to
use a circuitous
route around the settlement, 342 or to pass through Israeli
343
checkpoints.
In Ma'ale Adumim, Israeli Jews can find low cost housing-much
lower than housing in Jerusalem344--and the commute to Jerusalem is
short, making it convenient for those who work there. 345 As such,
Ma'ale Adumim has effectively become a mainstream suburb of
Jerusalem with the independent infrastructure necessary to maintain a
community. 34 Many of the schools, retailers, synagogues, and
community centers received 3government
subsidies to encourage
7
expansion within the settlement. 4
Plans to build more homes were announced in 2000, just before the
start of renewed negotiations between the Israelis and the
Palestinians. 348 The Palestinians issued a formal complaint to the
Israelis, stating that the announcement indicated that Israel would be

337. Jodi Rudoren, Dividing the West Bank, and Deepening a Rift, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1,
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unwilling to make the necessary concessions for peace. 349 Following the
failure of the 2000 negotiations, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon prioritized
continued expansion despite active conflict with the Palestinians. 35 0 By
this time, the population of Ma'ale Adumim had expanded to 30,000
residents, although the actual settlement encompassed less than half of
the municipal territory claimed for it by the Israeli government. 35 1 In
addition to having a large amount of land claimed for the settlement, the
in order to separate large areas of the West Bank
borders were drawn
352
from each other.

In 2005, following the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, Israel
announced intentions to begin construction on thousands of new homes
in Ma'ale Adumim. 353 Prime Minister Sharon stated that he intended to
retain the Ma'ale Adumim area in exchange for the loss of the Gaza
Strip.354 In 2007, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert pledged to halt the
building of any new settlements and stop the expropriation of additional
land in the West Bank355 but this announcement was understood to
allow Israel to continue building in Jerusalem and large settlements like
Ma'ale Adumim. 356 Similarly, in 2009, Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu placed a moratorium building new homes in the West Bank,
including Ma'ale Adumim, to encourage peace talks with the
Palestinians. 357 As before, there were exceptions to the Israeli decision;
they stated that building would continue in East Jerusalem and schools,
synagogues, public buildings, and other necessary structures would still
be built in the West Bank. In 2011, the Israeli government made the
decision to speed up the building of 2,000 more homes in West Bank
areas, including Ma'ale Adumim, it would like to keep once a
settlement is reached.359
Since at least 1982, U.S. administrations have discouraged Israeli
expansion of Ma'ale Adumim (as well as all other settlement activity
349.
350.
351.
352.

Id.
Williams, supra note 341.
Id.
Id.

353.

Charles

D.

Freilich, National Security Decision-Making in Israel: Process,

Pathologies,and Strengths, 60 MIDDLE E. J. 635, 647 (2006); Berg, supra note 338.
354. Laura King, Israel Planning to Add Settlers Near Jerusalem, TORONTO STAR, Mar.
22, 2005, at A10.
355. Isabel Kershner, IsraelRejects Hamas Overture, and Presses Housing Construction,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2007, at A7.

356.

Id.

357. Richard Boudreaux, The World; West Bank Growth MoratoriumSet; Settler Building
Hiatus is Aimed at Reviving Peace Talks, But PalestiniansCall the Israeli Step Inadequate,L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 26, 2009, at A39.
358. Id.
359. Israel's Decision on Housing Units 'Destroys Peace,' BBC MONITORING MIDDLE E.,
Nov. 2, 2011.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol26/iss2/1

44

Halabi: Jerusalem in the Courts and on the Ground
JERUSALEM IN THE COURTS AND ON THE GROUND

beyond the 1967 "green line"). In 1982, President Reagan stated that the
expansion was an obstacle to peace, and the area of Ma'ale Adumim
should ultimately be governed by the Palestinians in association with
Jordan. 360 The Israeli government rejected Reagan's proposal. 36 1 The
United States objected to building in Ma'ale Adumim throughout the
1990s and 2000s because West Bank expansion violated U.S. peace
362
blueprints which called for a freeze on settlement activity.
Throughout expansion plans, the Israeli government has clashed with
both the Bush3 63 and the Obama administration.364 The Bush
administration sometimes objected to settlement and expansion
activities, 365 but stated that demographic makeup of the area should be
taken into account during negotiations. 366 367
The Obama administration
has been more critical of settlement activity.
2. The E-1 Corridor
Like Ma'ale Adumim, the E-I (East 1) corridor is located in territory
captured by Israel in the Six-Day War with Jordan 369
in 1967,368 and has
been claimed as state land by the Israeli government.
It is approximately 12 square kilometers and sits north and west of
Ma'ale Adumim, within its municipal area. 370 Though unfulfilled, there
have been plans to build two residential areas, an industrial area, a hotel

360.
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In 1990 President Bush stated that "my position is that the foreign policy of the
US says we do not believe there should be new settlements in the West Bank or
East Jerusalem." Again as late as 1991 the US voted for Security Council
Resolution 694 which referred to all the Palestinian territories occupied by
Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem.
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area, and a water reservoir in the E-1 area. 371 These plans were revived
by the Israeli defense minister in 1997. 372 Beginning in 2002, Israel
began constructing a set of concrete walls, ditches and fences (the
"separation barrier") separating its territory and settlements from Arab
population centers. 373374
The separation barrier wraps around the E-1 area
and Ma'ale Adumim.

West

Bank
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375

376

Work began on the E-1 corridor building plans in 2004,
which,
like Ma'ale Adumim proper, Prime Minister Sharon viewed as quid pro
371.
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quo for the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. 377 However, work
was frozen temporarily in 2005 when the Bush administration requested
its cessation on behalf of the Palestinians. 37 8 In 2012, following a
successful bid by the Palestinians to be a non-member observer state in
the United Nations, Israel announced that it would implement plans to
build 3,000 additional homes in the E-1 area. 379 This announcement was
strongly objected to by both the United States 380 and the European
382
Union 3 1 as harmful to both the peace process and Israel's interests.
The new building was explicitly tied to securing Ma'ale
Adumim and
383
the E-1 corridor in any future settlement with Palestine.
Including E-1 and Ma'ale Adumim within Israel's official borders
would effectively complete a ring of Israeli settlements in the West Bank
surrounding East Jerusalem.384 By settling immigrant Israelis there,385
Israel will limit Palestinian access to East Jerusalem. 386 This territory
would also jut deep into the West Bank, jeopardizing continuity for a
Palestinian state. 387 The Israeli government claims that a road may be built
that will provide Palestinians with unfettered access between Ramallah,
East Jerusalem, and Bethlehem although it is difficult to create
such a road
388
priorities.
security
Israeli
with
conflict
also
not
would
that
Since 1982, the Israeli government has been adamant that they will
not surrender Ma'ale Adumim or the E-1 area to Palestinian control.389
Indeed, Israeli prime ministers from every part of the Israeli political
spectrum-Benjamin Netanyahu, Ehud Olmert, Shimon Peres, Yitzhak
Rabin, and Ariel Sharon have committed to retaining both as part of any
final agreement between Israel and Palestine although it is entirely
possible that this is posturing.3 90 The Clinton Parameters for peace
called for Ma'ale Adumim to be annexed as compensation for agreeing
377. King, supra note 354.
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to partition Jerusalem. 39 1 Israeli annexation of Ma'ale Adumim and E-1
would result in essentially four divided Palestinian population centers:
East Jerusalem, the Northern West Bank, the Southern West Bank, and
Gaza. 392 Palestinian leaders have emphasized the one-state
solution as
393
an alternative to disaggregated Palestinian territories.
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry is now in an energized effort to
reach a final resolution based on the two-state solution, an effort that,
once again, involves a freeze on settlement expansion in the West
Bank. 3 Israel has already declared any such freeze will not include
some settlements, including Ma'ale Adumim. 395 Echoing past cycles of
negotiation and failure (and potential redirection of the Palestinian selfdetermination movement), the Abbas government
has responded by
396
refusing to recognize Israel as a Jewish state.
CONCLUSION

This Article has argued that by examining certain "interpretation
catalysts"--presidential speeches from Clinton to Obama and the U.S.
Government's pleadings in its lawsuit with the Zivotofskys (and, by
extension, Congress), it is possible to see a growing flexibility toward
adopting a foreign policy position that accommodates a Palestinian selfdetermination movement that sounds more like civil rights in Israel
rather than sovereignty under international law. The Article does not
argue that there has been a fundamental abandonment of the two-state
solution in U.S. foreign policy. Indeed, President Obama and Secretary
of State John Kerry have explicitly adopted it as their current platform
in the predictable second-term push for Arab-Israeli peace. However,
given the realities on the ground, firstly and most importantly with
respect to Jerusalem, it is possible to see a U.S. acceptance that the time
for the two-state solution may have already passed.
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